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ABSTRACT
The process of change from a centr l-plan system to a market economy generates institutions that
are incomplete and unstable and in consequence generate high transaction costs. Multinational
enterprise entering transition countries have to adapt their strategies to the local institutions and
reduce xposure to highly imperfect markets. This paper analyzes how the costs of organizing
business in transition environments influence entry mode choice. The empirical results show that
host country institutions, specifically in the transition economies, impact on the choice of entry
modes.
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INTRODUCTION
Entry strategi s of international business are adapted to the local institutions in the pertinent host
economies (e.g. Oxley 1999, Peng 2000). Institutions are imp rtant for the functioning of a market
economy as they constrain or facilitate business, and their establishment is an essential part of
economic development and transition (e.g. Clague 1997, Harriss et al. 1995). To understand
business strategies in emerging markets, it is necessary to analyze investment decisions in different
institutional contex s, and the role and effects of institutions in reducing transaction costs (TC) in
particular (Hoskisson et al. 2000). We focus on transition economies, where firms face unusually
unstable and inconsistent institutions during the process of change from central-plan coordination
to a market economy (Swaan1997b).
Multinational enterprises organize their cross-border operations as international trade,
through contractual modes of coordination, or with equity investment as joint- or wholly-owned
ventures. These modes provide varying degrees of control over the l cal operations, and have been
analyzed with the TC approach (e.g. Anderson a  Gatignon 1986, Hennart 1991) as well broader
eclectic frameworks (Hill et al. 1990, Bell et al. 1997). This research has recently been extended
to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Brouthers et al. 1998, Meyer ), y t with few reflections
on the transition-specific influences. We analyze the transition environments and their impact on
entry mode choice, based on a unique survey of British and German businesses active in these
economies. We argue, and show empirically, that entrants adust their mode choice to the specific
TC arising due to different institutional frameworks.
The next section discusses the evolution of institutions i  transition economies, their impact
on TC, and consequently on entry mode choice. Section three introduces the methods of empirical
analysis. Results are presented and interpreted in the section four. Section five concludes.
INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSACTION COSTS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
The essence of economic transition “from plan to market” (World Bank 1996) is the replacement
of one coordination mechanism by another. The socialist regimes had strong vertical coordination
of society and economy, but failed, among other reasons, because horizontal linkages were weak
(Vlachoutsicos 1998) leading to high TC between enterprises within supply chains (e.g. Chikan
1996). 
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Transition was to introduce more efficient coordinati n mechanisms. Yet, efficient markets
depend on supporting institutions that can provide the (formal and informal) rules of the game of
a market economy. Institutions reduce both transaction and information costs by reducing
uncertainty and establishing a stable structure to facilitate interactions (North 1990). However,
these were not in place when the socialist system disintegrated. With the dissolution of the plan,
administrators became independent economic agents. They had to act on markets that did not yet
exist; they lacked both the (tacit) knowledge on how to use the market mechanism and the market
knowledge about potential partners and competitors. Without experience in a market context,
agents had to identify potential types of business and preferences of ot ntial business partners; and
they had to learn to assess the composition of demand and supply, notably to estimate demand
elasticity. Thus, agents engaged in considerable search processes to set up transactions and to find
the right prices. All this increases TC of establishing new business relationships, and can inhibit
many potential transactions (Swaan 1997b, Meyer 2001).
The rapid progress in establishing market-based institutions (Table 1), has reduced, but not
eliminated, these high TC. Rapidly changing institutions may yield, at any point in time,
inconsistency between institutions and uncertainty ov  future changes. Businesses react by relying
on inherited systems of personal networks that served to overcome shortage under the central plan,
and retained their importance as a coordination mechanism during transition. Network-based
coordination has been observed throughout the region, e.g. in Hungary (Stark 1996, Whitley et al.
1996), the Czech Republic (Clark and Soulsby 1995), and Russia (Puffer 1996, Holden et al. 1998),
where it is reenforced by cooperative value systems and traditions such as blat (Ledeneva 1999).
*****
table 1 approximately here
*****
Western businesses entering the transition economies also face high TC. This arises from lack of
information about their partners; negotiations with partners inexperienced in business negotiations
(Antal-Mokos 1998); unclear regulatory frameworks and an inexperienced bureaucracy (e.g.
Thornton and Mikheeva 1996); the underdeveloped court system, and corruption. Among other
institutions, the protection of intellectual property is weak, which as shown by Oxley (1999)
--  4  --
increases investors preference for hierarchical modes. Similarly, full control may permit faster
turnaround of acquired former state-owned enterprises (Aulakh and Kotabe 1997). 
However, the costs of internal organization are also high. The whole economy of th
central-plan regime was based on a hierarchy that established quantitative output targets for firms,
with few incentives to provide quality and customer service. Workers and managers have thus
developed considerable exp ri nce in shirking, and the underlying routines and attitudes persist in
the transition (e.g. Sztompka 1993, Ledeneva 1999). 
Moreover, the costs of establishing a wholly-owned operation are high. Until recently,
acquisitions were only possible as part of the privatization process, which required complex
negotiations with governmental authorities, management and work councils (e.g. Carlin et al.
1995). After the acquisition, post-socialist firms need considerable investment in enterprise
restructuring and major changes in corporate strategy, organizational structure a d culture ( .g.
Newman 1998, Meyer and Mrller 1998). Often, investors are also expected to assume financial and
environmental liabilities of the acquired firm. Privatization-agencies often pursued ‘staggered
privatization’ (Perotti and Guney 1993) offering initially only minority ownership, with an option
to increase the share in equity later.
Greenfield investment may be too slow to achieve the desired strategic objectives, notably
if firms pursue first-mover advantages (Meyer and Estrin 1999). They too face considerable
establishment costs as local bureaucracies are slow, e.g. in approving acquisition of real estate.
Moreover, greenfield projects may face more problems than modes involving a local partner when
integrating into local business networks. This, however, is considered vital for business success,
especially in Russia (e.g. Thornton and Mikheeva 1996, Puffer 1996).
Thus, the costs of setting up a fully-owned local operation in a transition economy are high.
We expect establishment costs and costs of internal organization to outweigh the TC arising from
weaker protection of pr perty rights. The progress in economic transition and institution building
reduces these costs, and facilitates higher degrees of internalization:
H1: Entrants are more likely to establish wholly-owned subsidiaries in advanced transition
economies.
Many empirical studies found that distance increases the likelihhod of low involvement modes (Davidson and1
McFetridge 1985, Gatignon and Anderson 1988,  Gomes-Casseres 1989, Kogut and Singh 1988, Kim and Hwang
1992). Padmanabhan and Cho (1996) found an opposite effect, while Erramilli (1996) finds no significant effects.
Bell et al. (1997) find a curve-linear effect sugg s ing that both very small and very large cultural distance increases
the likelihood of JVs. Brouthers et al. (1998) argue that not only cultural distance but cultural attributes of host
country (also see Shane 1994) and home country should be considered.
--  5  --
Progress in transition brings the economic structure of host econ mies closer to Western European
patterns. The structure of the economy in terms of, e.g., market size, competition and institutions
is an important aspect of psychic distance (Nordström 1991). Operating in psychically distant
countries, investors have to overcome the ‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer 1995): they have to
gather information, train local staff and adapt management to the local vir nment. Moreover, risk
assessment is hampered because the investor is not accustomed to the nature of many sources of
risk and because of political influences on trans-border transactions (Caves 1996).
Psychic distance increases the cost of all forms of business, yet to different degrees (e.g.
Oxley 1999). It reduces trust, and thus inhibits the formation of hierarchies (Root 1983, Shane
1994). At the same time, costs of organizational learning increase, which affects especially JVs and
acquisitions (Kogut and Zander 1993, Barkema et l. 1996). The majority of prior studies s ggest1
that greater the psychic distance, the greater would be the preference for external modes.
The psychic distance effect reinforces the effect of progress in transition as less reformed
economies require more local adaptation. In addition, psychic distance is lower for source countries
closer to the region: institutions in CEE converge with continental West European ones. Moreover,
directly neighboring countries, like Germany, have a history of private and business contacts.
H2: Entrants originating in closer psychic proximity to transition economies are more likely
to establish wholly-owned subsidiaries.
Knowledge Transfer
A prime theme of the TC and entry mode choice literature has been the market failure for
information and knowledge transfer, be it due to information symmetr es (Arrow 1971) or tacitness
of the knowledge (Kogut and Zander 1993).  Consequently, direct investment is frequently
associated with the "public good haracter of knowledge within the firm" (Caves 1971:4), and the
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transfer of brand-names as free-riders may otherwise degrade the quality of products (e.g.
Anderson and Gatignon 1986).
In the transition economies, th se issues are of particular concern because the institutional
framework does not (yet) provide for efficient protection of property rights. Hence technology-
intensive firms would prefer to internalize their transactions in high-tech goods and services. These
firms are concerned about the transfer of technology-based capabilities, which includes production
know-how, assessment of market opportunities for innovative products, feedback from sales to
product development, as well as the training of sales and service personnel. In line with earlier
research (e.g. Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Denekamp 1995, Hennart 1991) we thus propose:
H3a: Entrants that transfer technology are more likely to establish a wholly-owned subsidiary.
However, in CEE, technology transfer comes second to the transfer to modern managerial skills.
Investors have to engage in management training and education in areas such as marketing,
accounting and finance along with training in modern leadership skills (e.g. Child and Czegledy
1996). This transfer is necessary because management skills in the central plan system were
fundamentally different (e.g. Puffer 1996). Yet, this requires transfer of acit knowledge (Kogut
1996, Swaan 1997a), which according to Kogut and Zander (1993, 1996) cannot be transferred
across markets as it requires personal interaction between transferor and recipient. We thus
propose: 
H3b: Entrants that build up local management capabilities are more likely to establish a wholly-
owned subsidiary.
METHODOLOGY
Modeling Organizational Modes
Export and import are basic forms of international transactions as goods leave the sphere of
influence of an exporting firm when handed over. The customer may organize logistics, distribution
and possibly also other final stages of the product chain. The exporter may support local operations
by training local partners but cannot control the use of goods and know-how transferred. 
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 International contracts can organize different types of transactions that transfer goods or
services to a local partner in exchange for a fee or a share in revenues, e.g. licensing, franchising,
subcontracting, and management contracts. Contracts may provide rights to constrain or monitor
the partner. Notably, strong foreign partners can gain some degree of control over local partners
in less advanced economies if the latter become dependent upon forign inputs (e.g. Contractor and
Kundu 1998).
A joint-venture (JV) places the local business unit under the joint control of the legally
independent local and foreign partners (e.g. Harrigan 1988, Parkhe 1991, Ramamanathan et al.
1997). Through profit sharing, JVs create incentives to support the ccess of the venture, but they
only partly eliminate the incentives to shirk on the partner. Moreover, JVs create complex
governance problems between the partners. JVs are therefore avoided, unless TC in one or more
of the markets concerned are very high and full internalization is not feasible (Hennart 1988,
Buckley and Casson 1988).
Finally, the entrant can obtain full control over the l cal operation by establishing a wholly-
owned subsidiary or branch. This integrates the foreign operation into the multinational enterprise
and eliminates the need to accommodate the interests of a local partner. As a trade-off, however,
the investor then has to integrate a foreign business unit in its hierarchy and monitor foreign
employees.
Most empirical studies analyze entry modes as dichotomous choices (e.g. Davidson and
McFetridge 1985, Gomes-Casseres 1989, Hennart 1991). Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Kim and
Hwang (1992) and Agarwal and Ramaswani (1992) use multinomial models to analyze the
determinants of joint-ventures. Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) present an extended analysis of direct
exports, wholly-owned subsidiaries and an intermediate construct. This paper analyzes the full
range of entry modes: international trade, contractual arrangements, JVs and wholly-owned
subsidiaries. The mode of business is a categorical variable defined as follows:
(1) MODE = 3 if the business relationship involves only trade
= 2 if the business relationship involves contracts, but no direct investment
= 1 if the firm has established a joint-venture (JV), but no wholly-owned operation
= 0 if the firm has established a wholly-owned subsidiary.
Hennart (1993) modeled there mod s along one dimension from markets to hierarchies. However, formal tests that2
can be obtained from the author confirm the appropriateness of the multinomial model.
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The different modes are analyzed as alternatives without implicit order. In this, we follow
theoretical arguments suggesting that these modes differ by more than one dimension. Buckley and2
Casson (1996) show that licensing would be preferable if markets arboth highly volatile and large.
It is less attractive if patent rights are poorly protected or if the value of the technology is highly
uncertain. JVs are less attractive for business across high cultural distance because of coordination
problems. Root (1987) located exports and wholly-owned subsidiaries at opposite corners of a box
diagram with the dimensions 'risk' and 'control'. In his framework, contracts are characterized by
zero risk and some degree of control. Also, the recent literature on strategic alliances (see Beamish
and Killing 1997) commonly treats contractual modes underlying an alliance as distinct concepts
rather than intermediates. Hence, intermediate forms may best minimize TC because they can
effectively deal with specific kinds of TC.
The Enterprise Survey
The data for the analysis have been collected with a questionnaire survey of 677 West German and
British companies in winter 1994/1995. The questionnaire was sent in German or English to key
informants in the corporate headquarters to minimize information bias, after it had been tested in
interviews and a pilot study (Meyer 1998). The companies were selected randomly from a database
(Amadeus) of all firms in three broadly defined industries: food and beverages, chemicals, and
engineering. 269 firms replied (39%) and reported their business with five countries: Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Rumania. The returned questionnaires include firms
without business contacts in the region as, x a te, it was not known whether or not the firms were
active in CEE. The variation across various categories (e.g. size, industry, advertising expenditures)
was low, suggesting that the non-response bias is small. From the survey, 656 observations of
active business relationships of either mode in any of the five countries were obtained. Of these,
576 were used in the empirical analysis after eliminating missing values, providing a larger database
than most empirical international business studies in transition economies.
Variables
We use 1997 data for the empirical analysis as these are equally detailed but closer to the date of our survey than3
those reported in Table 1. The composite is the unweighted average of the 10 indices.
Measures for international experience have been included in prior studies including Teece (1977), Davidson and4
McFetridge (1985), Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Barkema et al. (1996), Kogut and Singh (1988).
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The progress of transition, which we expect to encourage wholly-owned operations (H1), is
measured  by a composite index TRANSITION based on the EBRD transition indices (Table 1).3
The differences of country of origin (H2) are proxied with a dummy variable GERMAN. Compared
with British firms, German firms are geographically closer to CEE and benefit from personal
relationships and traditionally more intensive trade relations.
The knowledge transfer (H3a, H3b) is proxied by both firm and transaction level variables.
R&D expenditures as percentage of turnover (R&D) captures technology intensity of the firm, as
in prior research. Managerial knowledge is proxied by human capital intensity
(HUMAN_CAPITAL), which we measure as personnel costs per employee. The survey provides
information on the incidence of knowledge transfer, which is introduced as dummy variables
T_TECHNOLOGY and T_MANAGMENT respectively. In addition, we presume that consumer
goods manufacturers (dummy: CONSUM_GOODS) need to transfer more managerial know-how
to establish new systems for marketing and distribution. They exchange sensitive marketing
information with loca marketing units, and monitor product quality to maintain brand reputation.
For precise definitions of the variables refer to the appendix.
Control Variables
Prior research has pointed to the importance of organizational capabilities determining the
(opportunity) costs of internalization (reviewed by Delios and Beamish 1999). We t erefore include
further firm-specific and transaction-specific variables as controls. Firms with related experiences
and economies of scale and scope can organize a given transaction at lower costs. Large and
experienced firms can share their resources, such as international management cadres and
organizational capabilities, across operations. Hence, the marginal costs of an additional entry are
lower. Size is proxied by firms’ employment (SIZE), and global experience (GLOBAL) by the
share of employment outside the home country.4
In addition to general capabilities of international business, certain capabilities are specific
to the country or region of entry. This includes knowledge of the legal, social and economic
I thank Mark Casson for pointing ou that conventional analysis of transaction costs at firm level implicitly assumes5
that all firms engage in the same kind of transactions. Proper testing of TC theory therefore requires to control for
different types business undertaken by these firms.
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framework, contacts with local partners and government authorities, and product adaptation to
local tastes, legal requirements and specific inputs. Established investors have acquired tacit
knowledge through experiential learning (e.g. Barkema et al. 1996) and can better assess the
investment risk (Aulakh and Kotabe 1997). Therefore, firms with experiences in the country are
more capable of managing internalized business (Gomes-Casseres 1989, Hennart 1991). 
In transition economies, learning on local business conditions is particularly important. A
long-established presence improves the familiarity with culture-specific business practices and
personal relationships, which are built over time and provide an important basis for business,
especially in Russia (Ledeneva 1999, Holden et al. 1998). We measure this region-specific
experience (REGION) by the share of turnover in CEE in total sales.
We moreover include an industry dummy for pharmaceuticals (PHARMA). In CEE, this
industry requires lengthy approval procedures and is highly dependent on government policy since
the health sector, its predominant customer, is a highly regulated service. Therefore, investment
may be primarily determined by the outcomes of government-industry negotiations.
Furthermore we control for different international strategies pursued by the investors (cf.
Hill et al. 1990). Different types of local operations create different cross-border interfaces, varying
in their sensitivity to TC. Therefore, dummies are included for the types of transactions.5
Downstream, market-oriented business is used as base case, and dummies are added for upstream
business (UPSTREAM) and for business with both upstream and downstream operations
(UP&DOWN). The different kinds of goods transferred are controlled for with dummies for final
goods only (T_FINAL), final and other goods (T_FIN_ETAL), and for market-seeking business
with only knowledge transfer (T_NONE). Furthermore, we include a control dummy for firms
affiliated to non-European parents (NONEUR). Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses, proxies and
the expected signs on ‘wholly-owned subsidiary’.
*****
Table 2 approximately here
*****
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Table 3 approximaltely here
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RESULTS
Table 3 presents the regression results. The highly significant coefficients on TRANSITION
support H1, which proposed that progress in building institutions increases investors’ preference
for internalization. Business in the advanced transition economies is more likely to be wholly-
owned, with small differences between other the modes. Thus, slow transition inhibits in particular
the establishment of business under sole foreign ownership, which requires negotiations with
privatization agencies, restructuring former state-owned enterprises, and operational management
in the ‘post-socialist’ culture. Our results are opposite to Oxley’s (1999) findings if we assume that
progress in transition and protection of intellectual property rights are positively related. This
suggests that a range of institutional factors influence mode choice and should be explored in
greater detail in future research.
GERMAN firms are more likely to choose wholly-owned subsidiaries and have, relative to
British firms, a particular aversion against contracts and, to a lesser extent, JVs. This supports H2,
which proposed that wholly-owned operations are more fe sible in nearby locations. Proximity and
familiarity facilitate German entry into CEE without reliance on a local partner. Trade is less
affected by psychic distance than cooperative modes because it requires less intensive interaction
with local agents.
However, German and British firms differ by more than just distance to the transition
economies. For instance, corporate culture, which is grounded in the culture the home
environment, influences entry strategies in many ways (e.g. Brouthers et al. 1998). In a transition
context, Barz (1999) observes that German firms take a more long-term perspective on their
operations in Russia. This provides for an alternative explanation of the coefficients found for
GERMAN.
The internalization incentives arising from control over know-how are partially supported
as wholly-owned subsidiaries are preferred over trade. Yet, apart from managerial knowledge, it
Note that pharmaceuticals companies significantly abstain from wholly-owned subsidiaries. The regressions were6
also run without the PHARMA dummy which frequently returned significant reverse coefficients of the R&D
variable. This can be explained by the behavior of pharmaceuticals companies, which enter CEE with relatively
mature products.  Excluding the PHARMA firms from the analysis yields results that are substantially identical to
those presented in the text.
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appears not to affect other choices. The coefficients on R&D are correctly signed, but the actual6
transfer of technology is, surprisingly, more associated with JVs than with wholly-owned
subsidiaries, though not significantly. In contrast to H3a, contracts, JVs and wholly-owne
subsidiaries appear all suitable for the transfer of technology, despite their different control
mechanisms.
This contrasts with the results for managerial knowledge (H3b). Th firm-level variables
(HUMAN_CAPITAL, CONSUM_GOODS) are correctly signed, though not significant. Actual
transfer of management know-how (T_MANAGMENT) is more likely to occur, as predicted, in
wholly-owned subsidiaries and JVs, but not with contracts and trade. The transfer of management
is the only information-related variable separating contractual cooperation and equity investment.
Overall, the evidence for the link between of information intensity and higher degrees of
internalization is weak. Knowledge intensive firms face the main differences between exports and
the other modes.
More interesting are the differences between technological and managerial know-how. Our
findings correspond with results by Ghemawar and Kennedy (1999) who found that relative to
imports foreign investment into Poland is high in advertising intensive industries, but low in R&D
intensive industries. This reflects the absorptive capacity of local management (Lyles and Salk
1997): Eastern Europe has a solid basis in technological skills, but its human capital is weak in
terms of managerial skills for a market economy (e.g. Swaan 1997a). Managerial knowledge
transfer often involves tacit knowledge, which is more costly to transfer and therefore preferably
internalized. This is of great importance for transition economies, though not necessarily elsewhere.
The control variables largely confirm expectations. Firms with extensive worldwide
experience prefe wholly-owned subsidiaries, as indicated by the highly significant coefficients on
GLOBAL. Their experience reduces costs of internal organization, and thus facilitates
internalization. However, firm size (SIZE) favors wholly-owned subsidiaries only vis-a-vis
contracts, indicating that contracts are used in particular by smaller firms. Region-specific
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experience (REGION) is correctly signed but insignificant. The NONEUR dummy shows a
preference of firms with non-European parents for trade or wholly-owned subsidiaries. This may
reflect that the scale of worldwide operations is not appropriately represented in the accounting
data for the UK or German affiliate in the sample. The activity dummies were expected to indicate
preference for internalization whe ever they reflect more interactions between the parent firm and
the country. The transfer of final goods (T_FIN_ETAL, T_FINAL), leads to more internalization
as does the combination of business with both up- and downstream components (UP&DOWN).
Limitations
We introduced the variable TRANSITION to proxy the variation of the institutional environment
in the host economies. More detailed institutional variables would be desirable, yet we found a high
correlation of different institutional and economic variables across the five countries that made it
impossible to include several variables simultaneously. Future research should include more host
countries to overcome this problem.
Moreover, the present sample is unbalanced as only few observations relate to contracts
or JV. This explains some of the insign ficant results for these modes. Last not least better proxies
for the transfer of technology and management know-how would be necessary to explore the
impact of different forms of knowledge transfer. Not anticipating dramatic differences, we collected
only binary data on these.
INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSIONS
The institutions of an economy determine the pattern of TC encountered by business. They thus
select, and develop, coordination mechanisms that fit the environment. This is particularly evident
in transition economies, where firms use, e.g., network-based strategies (e.g. Stark 1996), and
barter (e.g. Seabright 2000). Foreign entrants too have to adjust to local conditions to
accommodate high TC arising with volatile and inconsistent institutions. This is illustrated by the
importance of environmental variables like ‘progress in transition’ and ‘psychic distance’.
Apparently, protection of intellectual property (Oxley 1999) is only one of several institutions of
concern.
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This note reports a first empirical study of the link between institutions, transaction costs
and entry mode choice in transition economies. Future research should refine both the theoretical
and empirical analysis. Theoretical work should elaborate on the interaction between specific
institutions, such as capital markets or protection of intellectual property, the TC in the pertinent
markets, and the choice of business strategies minimizing these TC. Empirical studies should
include more specific measures of institutions across a wider range of host countries.
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Appendix: Definitions of the Independent Variables
CONSUM_GOODS Dummy, taking the value of 1 if a consumer goods manufacturer, 0 otherwise.
GERMAN Dummy, taking the value of 1 if the contacted firm is in Germany, 0 if it is in the UK.
GLOBAL Percentage share of employment outside the home country in total employment, from (i)
annual reports, (ii) Dun Bradstreet and Hoppensteadt directories, (iii) question 12.
HUMAN_CAPITAL Ratio of personnel expenditures in £ sterling over employment, from (i) Amadeus database
(ii) from annual reports or (iii) follow up questionnaire.
R&D Percentage ratio of research and development expenditures over turnover, from (i) annual
reports, (ii) "The 1993 UK R&D Scoreboard" (Company Reporting Limited), (iii) question
13 of the questionnaire, (iv) follow-up questionnaires, (v) predicted values of a regression
equation using only variables not employed elsewhere in this research.
REGION Percentage share of turnover in CEE in total turnover of the firm. From (i) annual reports of
the firm, (ii) question 12, (iii) follow-up questionnaires, (iv) from the questionnaire.
SIZE Number of employees of the firm, from (i) Fame and Amadeus database (ii) annual reports
(iii) Dun Bradstreet and Hoppensteadt directories, (iv) follow-up questionnaires. For
regression analysis divided by 10.5
T_MANAGMENT Dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent indicated transfer of managerial and or
marketing know-how, zero otherwise. 
T_TECHNOLOGY Dummy, taking the value of 1 if the respondent indicated transfer of patented and/or
unprotected technological know-how, zero otherwise.
TRANSITION    Unweighted average of ten indices presented by EBRD (1997) for the progress in economic transition.
They cover aspects of enterprise reform, development of markets, financial institutions and the legal
framework.
--  16  --
References: 
Agarwal, S. and S.N. Ramaswani. 1992: Choice of foreign market entry mode: impact of ownership, location and
internalization factors, J urnal of International Business Studies 23, p. 1-27.
Anderson, E.M. and H. Gatignon. 1986: Modes of foreign entry: A transaction costs analysis and propositions, Journal
of International Business Studies, 17 (3), p. 1-26.
Antal-Mokos, Z. 1998. Privatisation, Politics, and Economic Performance in Hungary, Cambridge, CUP.
Arrow, K. J. 1971. Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing, Ch cago.
Aulakh, P.S. and M. Kotabe 1997. Antecedents and Performance of Channel Integration in Foreign Markets, Journal
of International Business Studies 28, p. 145-175.
Barkema, H.G., J. Bell and J.M. Pennings 1996. Foreign Entry, Cultural Barriers and Learning, Strategic Management
Journal 17, p. 151-166.
Barz, M. 1999. British and German MNCs in Russia and the FSU: Evidence from the Western Side, in: D.Dyker, ed.:
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer in the Former Soviet Union, Chelt nham: Elgar.
Beamish, P.W. and J.P. Killing, eds. 1997. Cooperative strategies: North American perspectives, San Francisco:
Lexington.
Bell, J., H.G. Barkema and A.Verbeke 1997. An Eclectic Model of the Choice between wholly-owned Subsidiaries and
Joint-Ventures as Modes of Foreign Entry, in: P.W. Beamish and J.P. Killing, eds: Cooperative Strategies: European
Perspectives, San Francisco: Lexington, p. 128-157.
Brouthers, K.D. , L.E. Brouthers and G.Nakos. 1998. National Cultural Influences on Central and Eastern European
Entry Mode Selection, AIB Conference, Vienna.
Buckley, P. J. and M.C. Casson. 1988: A Theory of Cooperation in International Business, in: F.J. Contractor and P.
Lorange, eds, Cooperative Strategies in International Business, San Francisco: Lexington, p. 31-54, 
Buckley, P. J. and M.C. Casson. 1996: An Economic Model of International Joint Venture Strategy, Journal of
International Business Studies 27, p. 849-876.
Carlin, W., J. van Reenen and T. Wolfe 1995. Enterprise Restructuring and Dynamism in Transition Economies,
Economics of Transition 3, p. 427-458.
Caves, R. E. 1971: International corporations: The industrial economics of foreign investment, Economica 38, 1-27.
Caves, R.E. 1996. Multinational Enterprize and Economic Analysis, 2nd. ed., Cambridge: CUP.
Chikan, A. 1996. Consequences of Economic Transition on Logistics: The Case of Hungary, International Journal of
Physical Distribution and Logistics Management 16, no. 1.
Child, J. and A.P. Czegledy 1996. Managerial Learning in the Transformation of Eastern Europe: Some Key Issues,
Organization Studies 17, p. 167-180.
Clark, E. and A. Soulsby 1995. Transforming former state enterprises in the Czech Republic, Organization Studies 16,
p. 215-242.
Clague, C. 1997. Institutions and economic development: Growth and governance in less-developed and post-socialist
countries, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Contractor, F.J. and S. Kundu 1998. Modal choice in a world of alliances: Analyzing organizational forms in the
international hotel dector, Journal of International Business Studies 29, p. 325-358.
Davidson, W.H. and Donald G. McFetridge 1985: Key Characteristics in th  Choice of International Technology Transfer
Mode, Journal of International Business Studies 16, no. 2, p. 5-21.
Delios, A. and P. Beamish 1999. Ownership strategy of Japanese firms: transactional, institutional and experience
influences, Strategic Management Journal.
--  17  --
Denekamp, J.G. 1995. Intangible Assets, Internalization and Foreign Direct Investment,  Journal of International
Business Studies 26, p. 493-504.
Erramilli, M.K. 1996. Nationality and Subsidiary Ownership Pattern in Multinational Corporations, Journal of
International Business Studies 27, p. 225-248.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 1999. Transition Report 1999, London: EBRD.
Gatignon, H. and E. Anderson 1988: The Multinational Corporation Degree of Control over Subsidiaries: An Empirical
Test of a Transaction Cost Explanation, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 4, p. 305-366.
Ghemawat, P. and R.E. Kennedy 1999. Competitive Shocks and Industrial Structure: The Case of Polish Manufacturing,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, F ll.
Gomes-Casseres, B. 1989: Ownership Structures of Foreign Subsidiaries. Theory and Evidence, Journal of E onomic
Behavior and Organization 11, p. 1-25.
Harrigan, K.R. 1988. Joint Ventures and Competitive Strategy, Strategic Management Journal 9, p. 141-158.
Harriss, J., J. Hunter and C.J. Lewis 1995. The new institutional economics and third world development, London:
Routledge. 
Hennart, J.-F. 1988: A transaction cost theory of equity joint-ventures, Strat gic Management Journal 9, 361-374.
Hennart, J.-F. 1991: The Transaction Cost The ry of Joint-Ventures: an Empirical Study of Japanese Subsidiaries in the
United States, Management Science 37, p. 483-97.
Hennart, J.-F. 1993: Explaining the Swollen Middle: Why most Transactions are a mix of 'Market' and 'Hierarchy',
Organization Science 4, p. 529-547.
Hill, C.W.L., P. Hwang and W.C. Kim. 1990. An Eclectic Theory of the Choice of International Entry, Strategic
Management Journal 11, p. 117-128.
Holden, N., C. Cooper and J. Carr 1998. Dealing with the New Russia: Management Cultures in Collision, Chichester:
Wiley. 
Hoskisson, R.E., L. Eden, C.M. Lau and M. Wright 2000. Strategy in Emerging Economies, Academy of Management
Journal, forthcoming.
Kim, W.C. and P. Hwang. 1992: Global Strategy and Multinationals' Entry Mode Choice, J urnal f International
Business Studies 23, p. 29-53.
Kogut, B. 1996. Direct Investment, Experimentation, and Corporate Governance in Transition Economies, in: R.
Frydman, C. W. Gray and A. Rapazynski (eds.): Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, vol. 1,
London and Budapest: Central European University Press, p. 293-332.
Kogut, B. and H. Singh 1988: The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode, Journal of Int rnational
Business Studies 19, no. 3, p. 411-32. 
Kogut, B. and U. Zander 1993: Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary Theory of the Multinational Corporation,
Journal of International Business Studies, p. 625-645.
Kogut, B. and U. Zander 1996: What do Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Learning, Organization Science 7, p.
502-518.
Ledeneva, A.V. 1998. Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange, Cambridge: CUP.
Lyles, M.A. and J.E. Salk 1996. Knowledge acquisition from Foreign Parents in International Joint Ventures: An
Empirical Examination in the Hungarian Context, Journal of International Business Studies 27, p. 877-903.
Meyer, K.E. 1998. Direct Investment in Economies in Transition, Aldershot: Elgar.
Meyer, K.E. 2001. Transition Economies, in: T. Brewer & A. Rugman, eds: Oxford Handbook of International
Business, Oxford: OUP, forthcoming.
Meyer, K.E. and S. Estrin 1999. Brownfield Entry in Emerging Markets, 
Meyer, Restructuring: Danish Experiences in Eastern Europe, European
16, p. 411-421.
 K .
Denison, ed.: .
Nordström,K. 1991. ,
Stockholm: Institute of International Business.
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: CUP.
ey, y
protection on the structure of inter-fi  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , p. 283-310.
Padmanabhan, P. and K.R. Cho
firms, Management International Review36, p. 45-63.
he, t
Ventures,  18
Peng, M.W. 2000. Business Strategies in Transition Economies
Perotti, E.C. and S.E. Guney 1993. The structure of privatization plans. Financia  Management22, p. 84-98.
Business and management in Russia, Aldershot: Elgar.
 K, A. 
Cooperative Strategies: North American Perspectives, San Francisco: Lexington, p. 51-85.
Foreign Market Entry Strategies, New York: Amacon. 
Entry Strategies for International Markets, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Inside the multinationals: The economics of internal markets, London: Croom Helm.
The vanishing rouble: Barter and currency substitution in post-socialist societies
CUP, forthcoming.
Shane,S. 1994: The Effect of National Culture on the Choice between Licensing and Direct Investment, c
Management Journal15, p. 627-642.
American Journal of Sociology , 993-1027.
Swaan, W. 1997a. Tacit knowledge and post-socialist tran  Economic Systems
21, p. 375-379.
997b. Knowledge, transaction costs and the creation of markets in post-socialist economies, in: P.G. Hare
and J. Davis, eds: , Vol. II, London and New York: Routledge, p. 53-76.
Sztompka,P. 1993. Civilizational incompetence: The trap of post-communist societies,  22
no. 2, p. 85-95.
Teece,D. 1986. Transaction cost economics and the multinational enterprise, d
Organisation1, p. 21-45.
 J :
alternatives to missing infrastructure,  38
Vl
paper no. 120, William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School, January.
Whitley,R., J. Henderson, L. Czaban and G. Lengyel 1996. Trust and contratucal relations in an emerging capitalis
economy, Organization Studies17, p. 397-420.
World development report: From plan to market, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
28, p. 341-363.
--  19  --
Table 1: Progress of Transition
CR PL R
Large-scale privatization 4 3+ 3+
4+ 4+ 4
3 3 2-
3 3+ 3-
4+ 4+ 2+
3 3 2+
3+ 3+ 2-
3 3+ 2-
3 3+ 3
3 4 3-
Countries: CR = Czech Republic, HU = Hungary, PL= Poland, RO = Romania, R = Russia
 n
ablishingthe relevant institutions. The classification is based on the EBRD’s office of the chie
economist.
EBRD 1999.
Hypothesis Preference Mean (St.Dev.)
TRANSITION index
H2 WOS .571 (.495)
R&D percentage
T_TECHNOLOGY dummy
H3b WOS 28,385 (9,836)
WOS .335 (.472)
WOS .410 (.492)
SIZE employees, 10 5
WOS .350 (.284)
WOS .026 (.026)
PHARMA dummy
NONEUR dummy
T_FIN_ETAL dummy
T_FINAL dummy
T_NONE dummy
UPSTREAM dummy
UP&DOWN dummy
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 Table 3: Multinomial Model
Wholly-owned Wholly-owned Wholly-owned 
vs. Joint-venture vs. Contracts vs. Trade
TRANSITION -2.650 (0.675)**** -2.036 (0.578)**** -2.692 (0.521)****
GERMAN -1.150 (0.638)* -2.899 (0.540)**** -0.847 (0.504)*
R&D -0.059 (0.082) -0.045 (0.056) -0.123 (0.490)**
T_TECHNOLOGY  0.704 (0.468)   0.074 (0.456) -1.630 (0.506)****
HUMAN_CAPITAL -0.012 (0.027) -0.011 (0.024) -0.035 (0.018)*
CONSUM_GOODS -0.139 (0.473) -0.395 (0.431) -0.746 (0.384)*
T_MANAGMENT  0.034 (0.500) -2.091 (0.410)**** -3.222 (0.387)****
SIZE -1.017 (1.088) -2.051 (0.946)** -1.166 (0.885)
GLOBAL -2.728 (0.890)**** -2.324 (0.733)**** -2.850 (0.685)****
REGION -11.064 (8.874) -7.168 (7.15) -9.634 (6.232)
PHARMA   0.241 (1.019)  1.369 (0.790)*  2.994 (0.688)****
NONEUR -1.801 (0.885)** -1.157 (0.601)*  0.634 (0.524)
T_FINAL -2.510 (0.623)**** -1.549 (0.552)*** -1.283 (0.524)**
T_FIN_ETAL -2.558 (0.723)**** -2.703 (0.707)**** -2.731 (0.673)****
T_NONE -1.305 (0.710)* -2.330 (0.784)**** -3.995 (0.865)****
UPSTREAM  0.324 (1.581)  1.248 (1.352)   1.776 (1.296)
UP&DOWN  0.686 (1.585) - 0.871 (1.383) -3.803 (1.333)****
Constant  12.150 (2.706)****12.422 (2.378)**** 17.024 (2.185)****
model P 536.16  (51) correct predictions 73.78%2
log-likelihood -403.775 D-statistic 39.90%
restr. log-likel. -671.855 P -test of IIA 24,199 (54)2
Levels of significance: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%, **** = 0,5 %
Negative sign = preference for a wholly-owned subsidiary
Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes
            Predicted
Actual 0 1    2   3      total
0 (Wholly-owned) 118      1 5  27   151
1 (JV) 5 8     4316    14
2 (contract) 15     3 45   8421 
3 (trade) 19        1 2986    272  
Total       168    19 37   352   576
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